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WEAKENING IT'S OWN DEFENSE?

THE NCAA'S VERSION OF
AMATUERISM
A basic purpose of this Association is to maintain intercollegiate
athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete
as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear
line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports. I

When President Theodore Roosevelt summoned representatives from
Yale, Harvard, and Princeton, 2 along with other "football leaders," 3 to the
White House in 1905 to discuss his concern over the increasingly dangerous,
and even fatal,' state of college football, it is unlikely that he considered the
future legal and philosophical battles that the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA)-the eventual result of this meeting-would face. What
began as a way to combat the "flying wedge formation" 5 turned into an
organization charged with safeguarding the ideals of collegiate athleticsdespite the fact that those ideals are often left for debate. Although the issue
of amateurism was already important in the early days of the Intercollegiate
Athletics Association of the United States (LAAUS, formally renamed the
National Collegiate Athletic Association in 1912),6 the present debate of
1. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N CONST., art 1.3.1, in 2002-03 NCAA DIVISION I
MANUAL (2002).
2. ARTHUR A. FLEISHER III ET AL., THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION: A
STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR 39 (1992); ALLEN L. SACK & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, COLLEGE
ATHLETES FOR HIRE: THE EVOLUTION AND LEGACY OF THE NCAA'S AMATEUR MYTH 32 (1998);
ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME
COLLEGE SPORTS 8 (1999).
3. SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 2.
4. Id; ZIMBALIST, supra note 2.
5. ZIMBALIST, supra note 2. The flying wedge "consisted of players locking arms, then heading
upfield in a V-formation with a runner located inside." Willie T. Smith III, Tribute to Flying Wedge a
StartingPointfor NCAA's Hall, USA TODAY, Mar. 30, 2000, at 7C.
6. SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 2, at 33; ZIMBALIST, supra note 2. For a history of events
leading up to the founding of the IAAUS and the NCAA, see FLEISHER III ET AL., supra note 2, at
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amateurism's legitimacy, both philosophically and legally in regard to antitrust
law, dwarfs those concerns of early twentieth century amateur notions 7 and all
but replaces Roosevelt's original concern of the flying wedge.
The question of amateurism's place in college sports extends beyond the
philosophical debate of whether collegiate athletes are also amateur athletes.
The argument also includes a legal aspect: whether intercollegiate athletics are
still "amateur" in nature, and whether the justification of amateur ideals should
serve as a defense in antitrust claims against the NCAA in light of the
accepted deregulation plans. While the NCAA is not categorically exempt
from antitrust laws, two things "have worked in its favor with respect to its
legal status ....First, sports in the United States have historically been given
a great deal of leeway in terms of their treatment under the antitrust laws ....
Second, the NCAA is strongly linked to higher education and traditions of
amateurism." 8 In part because of the acceptance by courts of this objective
and defense, 9 amateurism remains a legal lightning rod within college sports
and is one of the issues that could ultimately transform the foundation of big
time intercollegiate athletics from an institution tied to education to a minor
league system for professional sport leagues. 10
This comment will focus on amateurism in intercollegiate athletics,
particularly with regard to the NCAA's use of this ideal in its defense of
antitrust claims. While this paper will examine college sports in general, the
narrower focus in caselaw and commentary often turns to "big time college
sports," which refers generally to Division I athletics, and primarily to
Division I football and men's basketball programs. Section I provides an
overview of amateurism and focuses on the changing definition of what it
means to be "an amateur." Section II addresses the use of amateurism as a
defense to antitrust claims made against the NCAA, and will provide antitrust
discussion, including an explanation of the per se and rule of reason standards,
insight into the NCAA's regulations that may be classified as "commercial" or
"noncommercial," and an examination of the courts' attitude towards the

37-39.
7. SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 2, at 34-35.
8. FLEISHER III ET AL., supra note 2, at 6-7 (citations omitted).
9. Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3rd Cir. 1998); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D.
Tenn. 1990); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
10. While it may be argued that this is already the case, it is still only in theory. At this point,
scholarships received by student-athletes cover educationalexpenses. The implementation of a "pay
for play" system or the unionization of student-athletes, however, would create a different system of
"compensation" and likely eliminate the educational tie between intercollegiate athletics
and the
scholarship form of amateur pay. If this happens, then college athletics, at least on the "big time"
level, will become professional minor leagues.
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Finally, Section III addresses the
NCAA's mission of amateurism.
amateurism deregulation packages of Divisions I, II and III. Given that big
time college sports already stand close to the professional line, any form of
deregulation lessens the validity of the NCAA's amateurism, which often
serves as the Association's defense to antitrust allegations. If there is any
"saving grace" in these deregulation packages, it is that they are directed
towards pre-enrolled student-athletes, and that Division I, although it did
accept some change, did so in a conservative manner. Because of these
factors, the viability of the amateurism defense is likely to continue to survive
antitrust scrutiny in many instances.
I. A LOOK AT AMATEURISM
This section focuses on the evolution of the NCAA's amateurism ideal.
While some of the ideas that underlie the NCAA's actions are founded in
economic theory, 1' the purpose of this section is not to examine the economic
rationales and effects of the NCAA's behavior, but to explain the background
of amateurism so that it may be applied in later discussion regarding antitrust
issues. Additionally, this section will address the tension between the
"dictionary" definition of amateurism and the "NCAA" definition of
amateurism, and present a brief discussion on how amateurism is still present
in intercollegiate athletics, which provides later assistance when the NCAA
continues to use the defense.
A. Then and Now
The definition of amateurism has changed over time. Originally, the
concept began in England to "maintain class distinction in competitive
sport ....[and] 'was clearly attached to the elite establishment ....Those of
the leisure class were the accepted amateurs and the working class,
professionals.' 12 In the American context, an accepted definition of
"amateur" is a "person who engages in a study, sport, or other activity for
13
pleasure rather than for financial benefit or professional reasons."
Additionally, an amateur is "an athlete who has never competed for payment

11. For further discussions on the economic theory behind NCAA actions, see FLEISHER III ET
AL., supra note 2, and ZIMBALIST, supra note 2.

http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/amateurismGrant,
Editorial,
12. Christine
_deregulation/committee.pdf (quoting Bobby Dodd, president, Amateur Athletic Union) (last visited
Feb. 26, 2003).
13. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 63 (2d ed. 1993).
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14

or for a monetary prize."'
Early NCAA statements on amateurism comported favorably with the
amateurism ideal of intrinsic, rather than extrinsic, rewards. In 1906 the
NCAA's stance was that "[fjinancial inducements from any source, including
faculty or university financial aid committees, were not allowed. Singling out
prominent athletic students from preparatory schools was a violation of the
amateur code, as was playing those who were not bona fide students."' 15 In
addition, the 1916 NCAA bylaws defined the "amateur" as "one who
participates in competitive physical sports only for the pleasure, and the
'16
physical, mental, moral, and social benefits directly derived therefrom.
While this definition does not differ dramatically from the current "Principle
of Amateurism" in words, 17 the notion of receiving any remuneration for
athletic skill in the early years of the NCAA-as opposed to today's athletic
scholarships-was forbidden. Further action on the receipt of financial aid
occurred at the 1948 NCAA Convention when the Sanity Code, which
"represented the first attempt by the NCAA to couple rules on amateurism,
financial aid, and eligibility with an enforcement mechanism,"' 18 was passed.
Under this attempt to "ban[] a full athletic scholarship .... a student-athlete
could receive a tuition and fees scholarship (not room and board) if the student
had a demonstrated financial need and met the school's normal admissions
requirements." 19
Despite these rules and efforts to regulate payments to student-athletes,
boosters, alumni, and even athletic departments themselves 20 still attempted to
gain a competitive advantage through illegal payments to student-athletes. In
1956, in an effort to diminish these practices, the NCAA "voted to allow full
grants-in-aid (tuition, fees, room and board, books and $15 a month 'laundry
money'). But schools and their booster groups still sought a competitive
advantage and devised new ways to pay their athletes on the side." 21 This
14. Id. (emphasis added).
15. SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 2, at 34.
16. Id. at 34-35 (citations omitted).
17. The "Principle of Amateurism" states that
[s]tudent-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated
primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student
participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.
NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N CONST., art. 2.9.
18. FLEISHER III ET AL., supra note 2, at 47.
19. ZIMBALIST, supranote 2, at 23.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 23-24.
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tension still exists today with economic and commercial interests influencing
the management of the games. At this point in time, collegiate athletics and
those who run them sit in a precarious position with a difficult choice. They
can continue to fight against the increasing loss of amateur ideals in big time
college sports, or give in to the calls that herald intercollegiate athletics as
being a minor league version of professional sports.
From this overview, a few points emerge regarding the NCAA's
amateurism. First, based on the dictionary definition and the evolution of the
NCAA's financial aid stance, it is obvious that the debate on amateurism
becomes definitional at a point. For the NCAA's purposes, scholarships are
not "payment" or "monetary prize"2 2 because that would, in essence, eliminate
the "amateur" label of student-athletes that the NCAA uses. Second, it is also
clear that the NCAA has had a changing view on what qualities make an
"amateur." Currently, "[a]s long as athletic endeavors are tied to academics,
athletics are viewed as an avocation." 2 3 In addition, the "true concern of
amateurism" 24 has most recently been expressed as "competitive equity. 25 A
problem arises, however, because of the other aspects of intercollegiate
athletics that appear contradictory to the amateur definition. Finally, some
definitions of amateurism 26 prohibit any receipt of, or competition for,
monetary prize. This stands in contrast to the deregulation packages discussed
later.
The issue here is not that the NCAA cannot create its own rules as to
eligibility and the like, but that the use of the understood definition of
"amateur" is not entirely accurate. In essence, if the NCAA is to use the
amateurism defense in antitrust claims, it must note that it is the NCAA's
definition of amateurism that is being used, and that this definition
incorporates non-traditional exceptions to the amateurism ideal.
B. Amateurism's Existence in Today's College Sports
Despite the abundance of proof that intercollegiate athletics are moving
ever closer to the professional ranks, amateurism is still present to some extent
in the college arena. In general, college athletics offer an alternative to the
professional version of athletic competition. Among these differences are
22. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, supra note 13.

23. Division
I Subcommittee
on Amateurism
and Agents,
http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/amateurismderegulation/core-values.pdf
26, 2003).
24. Grant, supra note 12.
25. Id.
26. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, supra note 13 and text.

Core Values,
(last visited Feb.
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"[t]he mixture of athletic and academic production found among NCAA
members [that] does not exist in professional sports .... [the] built-in demand
for athletics among many students and alumni .... [and t]he rules of NCAA
contests[,] [which] generate a differentiated product from professional
sports." 2 7 Specifically, intercollegiate athletics have also been viewed
differently because of the theoretical ideals-educational and moral---derived
from them. Undoubtedly, this is where the amateurism defense garners its
strength:
Intercollegiate athletics continue a tradition from ancient times, in
which games allowed athletes to test and develop their own ability in
competitions with one another. In theory, at least, college sports
provided an important opportunity for teaching people about
character, motivation, endurance, loyalty, and the attainment of one's
personal best-all qualities of great value in citizens. In this sense,
competitive athletics were viewed as an extracurricular activity,
justified by the university as part of its ideal objective of educating the
28
whole person.
Regardless of these values, the NCAA's definition of amateurism deserves
challenge primarily because of the presence of economic objectives 29 in
intercollegiate sports that conflict with the amateur ideal. Despite the "unique
facets of college sports, approaching the NCAA and its members as economic
entities remains warranted .... because revenue is still an important objective
to collegiate decision-makers." 30
The commercial aspect of college
athletics-television contracts and bowl game revenue, for examplecounteracts the nonprofit, amateur motives of the organization. As discussed
later, this prevents the NCAA from avoiding economic and, hence, antitrust
analysis, 3 1 although some courts have held NCAA noncommercial restraints
32
as not subject to antitrust laws.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that amateurism is a much-maligned ideal,
there remains support that
intercollegiate athletics are and can continue to be an important part of
higher education. College sports can provide an important educational
27. FLEISHER III ET AL., supra note 2, at 13-14.
28.

JAMES J. DUDERSTADT, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AND THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 70

(2000).
29. FLEISHER III ET AL., supra note 2, at 14.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 7.
32. Smith, 139 F.3d at 185-86; Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 743; Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 303; see also
Coll. Athletic Placement Serv. v. NCAA, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7050 (D.N.J. 1974).
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opportunity to the student-athlete[s] .... Played with integrity and in
line with the educational mission of our schools, college sports can
serve both as entertainment and even as educational lessons for our
broader society. In fact, for most of college athletics the current
models seem to achieve these objectives . . ...
[T]he participants...
are first and foremost students, with their first priority being a college
33
education.
Arguably, however, many student-athletes do not consider a college
education as their first priority. While the educational link exists and remains
part of collegiate amateurism, the NCAA's commercial objectives, in addition
to its lessening of amateur standards, require that the current debate center on
the legitimacy of amateurism as an NCAA ideal, particularly with respect to
football and basketball, 34 and its validity in the antitrust arena. With this small
background and discussion regarding amateurism, the next section provides a
discussion of antitrust law and relevant caselaw dealing with intercollegiate
athletics and the NCAA's defense of amateurism.
II. AMATEURISM AS A DEFENSE TO ANTITRUST CLAIMS AGAINST THE NCAA
Section 1 of the Sherman Act 35 prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations. ''36 Since nearly every
agreement or contract restrains trade in some fashion, the United States
Supreme Court has held that the Sherman Act was intended to prevent only
unreasonable restraints of trade. 37 Therefore, restraints of trade must undergo

33. DUDERSTADT, supranote 28, at Preface ix.
34. Id.at Preface x.
35. The antitrust discussion in this article focuses on section 1 of the Sherman Act. This section
requires an agreement in the form of a combination or conspiracy in order for there to be a violation.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2003). The NCAA, however, is often misperceived as an "outside entity that has no
accountability and is unresponsive to its member institutions" when, in fact, "the NCAA is a
voluntary organization composed of member institutions.

NCAA rules are enacted by its

membership ....[T]he member institutions... are the NCAA." Tom Osborne, Editorial, NCAA's
Public Image an Inaccurate Reflection, NCAA NEWS, Mar. 18, 2002, at 4. Hence, while "[it is
fundamental that a single person or entity cannot by itself alone form a 'contract, combination, or
conspiracy,"' the NCAA can be sued as an entity engaged in such combination "because conceptually
the adoption and execution of... NCAA [b]ylaw[s] can be seen as the agreement and concert of

action of the various members of the association, as well as that of the association itself, and it is
permissible to sue but one of the several alleged co-conspirators."
1136, 1147 (5th Cir. 1977).

Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d

36. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
37. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984); see also Arizona v. Maricopa County Med.
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1982); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-
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some form of examination before being declared illegal. The two primary
analyses are the per se rule and the rule of reason. 38 This section will discuss
both standards, explain why restraints in college sports are judged under the
rule of reason, and focus on cases involving amateurism and the NCAA's
mission, with emphasis on the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial restraints.
A. An ExplanationofAntitrust Standards:The Rule of Reason and the
Per Se Rule
The first, and traditional, analysis of an antitrust allegation falls under the
rule of reason. This approach balances the procompetitive and anticompetitive
effects of the restraint 39 in a case-by-case evaluation. The examination under
the rule of reason begins with the plaintiff showing an actual or potentially
significant anticompetitive effect resulting from the defendant's actions. The
defendant then has the opportunity to demonstrate that the restraint has
procompetitive virtues, that the restrictions actually further these objectives,
and that the "procompetitive virtues of the alleged wrongful conduct justifies
the otherwise anticompetitive impacts." 40 In the case of its amateurism
defense, for example, the NCAA must "assert the promotion of amateurism as
a procompetitive [effect] justifying the restraint ....[and show that the rule]
'enhances competition' or ...that it is 'necessary to produce competitive
intercollegiate sports.' ' 4 1 Finally, the court will examine whether there is a
less restrictive alternative to the restraint at hand.
The second approach to antitrust analysis is the per se rule, which holds a
practice illegal simply by its occurrence. Judicially-established per se actions
42
include horizontal price fixing and market allocation between competitors.
The notion behind this rule is that certain practices in themselves are so
economically heinous that there is no need to expend judicial resources in a
rule of reason analysis. This approach is applied when "the practice facially
appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict

88 (1978); Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
38. See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998).
39. Chi. Bd of Trade, 246 U.S at 238.
40. Law, 134F.3dat 1017.
41. Gregory M. Krakau, Note, Monopoly and Other Children's Games: NCAA 's Antitrust Suit
Woes Threaten Its Existence, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 430 (2000) (quoting Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at
104).
42. ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KovAcIc, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 197 (4th

ed. 2001).
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competition and decrease output, 43 and where "agreements whose nature and
necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the
industry is needed to establish their illegality. '44 Since procompetitive effects
are not considered under this analysis, courts generally do not impose the per
se rule "until after considerable experience with the type of challenged
restraint. '45
Because the per se rule affords minimal analysis into
procompetitive advantages, the NCAA's best chance for success in defense of
an antitrust claim obviously falls under the rule of reason, where it can present
its justifications, such as the protection of amateurism, for the restraint at
issue. Due to established precedent, it is unlikely that the NCAA will have to
convince a court to employ a rule of reason analysis, since the Supreme Court
has established this as the rule in cases involving restraints in intercollegiate
46
athletics.
B. Escaping Per Se: Why College Sports are Judged Under the
Rule of Reason
i. Moving the Analysis to the Rule of Reason
Discussion of per se analysis is necessary because some of the NCAA's
alleged restraints fall under this standard 47 and would, under other
circumstances, remain under per se analysis.
Courts, however, have
determined that the rule of reason should apply to intercollegiate athletics,
therefore affording the NCAA an opportunity to present its procompetitive
rationale. The process of getting from per se analysis to the rule of reason
deserves a brief explanation.
One way to garner a deeper review of a restraint is to demonstrate an
argument that the court will consider legitimate enough to look at in a rule of
reason fashion. This argument must contain something more than an alleged
procompetitive effect, since the whole point of per se condemnation is the
"anticompetitive potential inherent ' 48 in such classified restraints, and that the
possibility of some procompetitive effect is so minimal as to not deter the

43. Broad. Music, Inc. (BMI) v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
44. Engineers, 435 U.S. at 692.
45. BMI,441 U.S. at 19 n.33; accordUnited States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
219 (1940); Bd.of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100 n.21.

46. See generallyBd.of Regents, 468 U.S. 85.
47. See, e.g., Law, 134 F.3d 1010.
48. MaricopaCounty, 457 U.S. at 351.
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"general application" of the rule. 49
The second method of escaping per se analysis stems from the first: There
are some elements in certain cases that will make courts distinguish them from
the usual per se categorization. Known as "characterization," courts have
moved a per se restraint into a rule of reason analysis because of the presence
of a learned profession, 50 a novel situation, 5 1 or an understanding that a
restraint is necessary if the product is to exist at all. 52 In these instances, the
challenged practice may have redeeming competitive virtues, such as
efficiency, ethical considerations, or public service, that would not be
discovered under the per se rule. Simply garnering rule of reason analysis,
however, is only the first step; the defendant still must demonstrate that the
restriction's procompetitive benefits outweigh its anticompetitive effects.
ii. NCAA v. Board of Regents: Rule of Reason Applied
The relevant characterization issue in the case of intercollegiate athletics
and the NCAA is demonstrated in NCAA v. Board of Regents,53 where the
Court determined that some restraints are necessary for the product of
intercollegiate athletics to exist.54 In Board of Regents, the NCAA awarded
television rights of college football games to two networks. 55 The plan
included the right to fourteen live telecasts per network (ABC and CBS),5 6
plus a "supplementary series" that included between thirty-six and forty
49. Id.
50. Engineers, 435 U.S. at 687; see also Vogel v. Am. Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 603
(7th Cir. 1984). In Engineers, for example, the National Society of Professional Engineers mandated
that, as a condition of membership, individual engineers were required to agree to refuse to negotiate

or discuss the question of fees with a prospective client until the client had selected engineers for a
particular project. This was the Society's attempt at preventing unusually low prices and
unsatisfactory engineering. The Court held this restraint, usually classified as per se illegal price
fixing, unreasonable under a rule of reason analysis by utilizing the characterization of professions.
In professions, certain practices might be reasonable, although viewed as a violation in another
context, because of the ethical and public service considerations behind the restraint. Professions are
not treated differently simply because they are professions, but because of the ethical and public
service benefits that may occur through a profession's rules. If it is established that the alleged illegal
act is not premised on ethics or public service, however, such restraint, if originally treated as per se,
returns to that classification and receives no further consideration.
51. BM, 441 U.S. at 20-22, 24 (where the Court examined the sale of blanket licenses, generally
understood as price fixing, under a rule of reason because of the novelty of the situation, and
acknowledged the importance of allowing the product to be sold in an effective and efficient manner).
52. Bd. ofRegents, 468 U.S. at 101.
53. 468 U.S. 85.
54. Id. at 100-01.
55. Id. at 92.
56. Id.
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exposures, 5 7 along with the authorization to "negotiate directly with member
schools for the right to televise their games." 58 In addition, the plan required
that each network schedule the games of at least eighty-two different schools
during a two-year period. 5 9 Combined, the two networks were prohibited
from televising an institution's games on television more than four times
61
nationally, and six times overall, 60 during any two-year period of the plan.
In effect, the plan "limit[ed] the. total amount of televised intercollegiate
football and the number of games that any one team [could] televise. No
member [was] permitted to make any sale of television rights except in
accordance with the basic plan." 62 The College Football Association (CFA),
made up of "five major conferences together with major football-playing
independent institutions," 63 desired greater say in the television rights and, in
64
1979, secured an independent, more beneficial contract offer from NBC.
When the NCAA announced that it would take disciplinary actions against
CFA members, the Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia brought an action
alleging that the NCAA's television control violated section 1 of the Sherman
65
Act.
Although the NCAA's plan of television rights to college football games
amounted to horizontal price fixing, which is "ordinarily condemned as a
matter of law under an 'illegal per se' approach because the probability that
[this] practice[] [is] anticompetitive is so high," 66 the Court found that "it
would be inappropriate to apply a per se rule to this case .... [because it]
involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential
if the product is to be available at all."' 67 The Court went on to discuss the
NCAA's role in the preservation and production of intercollegiate athletics 6 8
and that, although the NCAA's plan restricted price and output competition
between schools, "a fair evaluation of [the restraint's] competitive character
requires consideration of the NCAA's justifications for the restraints. '69 This
57. Id. at 92 n.7.
58. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 93.
59. Id. at 94.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63.. Bd of Regents, 468 U.S. at 89.
64. Id. at 94-95.
65. Id. at 95.
66. Id. at 100.
67. Id. at 100-01 (emphasis added).
68. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102.
69. Id. at 103.
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acknowledgement of the unique character of intercollegiate athletics has been
shown in other cases with the use of the rule of reason, as well. 70 The purpose
of analyzing Board of Regents is to show the use of the rule of reason in cases
involving the NCAA because of the "ample latitude" courts have found it
needs to preserve amateurism in college sports; 7 1 once this method of analysis
is chosen, there still remains the actual balancing of competitive effects where,
in the case of Board of Regents, the Court concluded that the NCAA's
television plan unreasonably restrained competition. 72 While not all restraints
will be held reasonable, the NCAA will at least receive a chance to prove their
reasonableness because of the necessity of certain restraints within the
industry of college athletics.
With the rule of reason analysis in place for examination of restraints
within intercollegiate athletics, the next part of this section examines the
defense of amateurism proffered by the NCAA within the rule of reason
analysis, with a focus on courts' handling of commercial and noncommercial
restraints.
C. Cases and Explanation:Rule of Reason Applied to Amateurism
The NCAA has faced a number of challenges to its rules under section 1
of the Sherman Act. This subsection will discuss those cases, focusing on the
distinction between two related issues: characterization used to determine if
commercial and noncommercial restraints are subject to antitrust scrutiny, and
the place of amateurism within the structure of antitrust consideration. The
essence of the amateurism defense is that the challenged restraints are in
furtherance of the NCAA's objective of amateurism, and that it is a
procompetitive justification for the NCAA's restraints that outweighs any
anticompetitive effect of these restraints.
i. Noncommercial Restraints: Exemption from Antitrust Analysis
One of the primary distinctions made by courts between NCAA
regulations is the commercial 73 and noncommercial 74 nature of various

70. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1018; Hairston v. Pac.-10 Conf, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1995);
Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 1992); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1343
(5th Cir. 1988); Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1132-33; Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 382 (D. Ariz.
1983).
71. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 103; Law, 134 F.3d at 1014.
74. Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1153; Jones, 392 F. Supp. 295.
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restraints. For example, in Justice v. NCAA 75 the court noted that "it is clear
that the NCAA is now engaged in two distinct kinds of rulemaking activity.

One type... is rooted in the NCAA's concern for the protection of
amateurism; the other type is increasingly accompanied by a discernible
economic purpose." 76 "Protection of amateurism" rules generally include
noncommercial eligibility regulations like the no-draft and no-agent rules, and
any other rules that control student-athlete participation. This distinction
between restraints is pertinent because antitrust laws are aimed at commercial,
competitive behavior, and not behavior that exhibits other, noncommercial
objectives. 77

Following this understanding of antitrust law "suggests that

regulations designed to achieve... noncommercial objectives are immune
from application of the antitrust laws." 78 Hence, some courts have held that
noncommercial restraints, such as those in the form of NCAA eligibility rules,
are not subject to antitrust analysis. 79 In these instances, the noncommercial
amateurism objective short-circuited any antitrust scrutiny, and demonstrated
that while there may be "aggressive enforcement of antitrust laws in 'business'

situations like those in Board of Regents and Law[, there may also be]
80
deference to the NCAA rules governing amateurism."
In Jones v. NCAA, 8 1 for instance, a Northeastern University hockey player
(Jones) was declared ineligible from intercollegiate competition because of his
pre-enrollment participation with Canadian and American "amateur" hockey
teams that compensated him for his services. 82 The determination of

ineligibility was based on Jones' alleged violation of the NCAA's "Principle
of Amateurism," which includes the prohibition of taking or accepting a
promise of pay for participation in the sport in question. 83 Jones alleged,

75. 577 F. Supp. 356.
76. Id.at 383.
77. Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1148 (quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493
(1940)); see also Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1959).
78. Krakau, supra note 41, at 403.
79. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 743 (noting that "the NCAA Rules are not subject to antitrust
analysis because they are not designed to generate profits in a commercial activity but to preserve
amateurism"); Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 303 (finding that "[a] threshold question is whether the Sherman
Act reaches the actions of N.C.A.A. members in setting eligibility standards for intercollegiate
athletics .... [T]his court concludes that it does not .... [N]ot every form of combination or
conspiracy allegedly in restraint of trade falls within [the Sherman Act]").
80. Krakau, supra note 41, at 407.
81. 392 F. Supp. 295.
82. Id.at 296-97.
83. Id.at 298-99 (citing NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N CONST.,art. 3.1 (1974)). For the
current (and generally similar) version of the "Principle of Amateurism," see NAT'L COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC Ass'N CONST., art. 2.9. For the current language on the prohibition of using athletic skill
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among other things, 84 that the NCAA's eligibility rules were a violation of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 85 Before beginning any analysis,
however, the court held that the Sherman Act did not "reach[] the actions of
N.C.A.A. members in setting eligibility standards for intercollegiate
athletics." 86 The court went on to note that this claim was
particularly inappropriate for application of the Sherman Act [because
t]he plaintiff is... not a businessman in the traditional sense, and
certainly not a "competitor" within the contemplation of the antitrust
laws ....[It has not been] shown how the action of the N.C.A.A. in
setting eligibility guidelines has any nexus to commercial or business
87
activities in which the defendant might engage.
Although the Jones court did go- on to analyze the strength of the
plaintiffs claim, 8 8 the statement of support for noncommercial eligibility
standards is important.
Since antitrust laws are aimed at regulating
competition with commercial objectives, college athletics eligibility ruleswith the objective of amateurism-do not, according to the Jones court, fall
within the ambit of antitrust analysis. According to the NCAA, its eligibility
rules were designed to promote the ideals of amateurism; while such rules may
harm a person's ability to participate in intercollegiate athletics, that harm has
been held to only be the "incidental result of the organization's pursuit of its
89
legitimate goals."
This understanding of the antitrust laws in Jones was proffered again in
Gaines v. NCAA. 90 Similar to Jones, the Gaines court found that antitrust
regulations did not apply to the NCAA's "no-draft" rule because of its
noneconomic, amateurism-based objective. 9 1 In Gaines, a Vanderbilt football
player (Gaines) challenged the NCAA's "no-draft" rule after he entered the
1990 National Football League (NFL) draft, was not drafted by any team, and
92
was then declared ineligible to finish his last year of eligibility at Vanderbilt.

for pay in a sport, see NCAA Division I Amateur Status. Bylaw 12.1.1(a), in 2002-03 NCAA
DIVISION I MANUAL (2002).
84. Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 296.
85. Id.at 303.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.at 303-04.
89. Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 304.
90. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. 738.

91. Id.at 744.
92. Id. at 740.
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93
While Gaines alleged that the NCAA was engaged in monopolistic practices
94
under section 2 of the Sherman Act, as opposed to a restraint of trade claim
under section 1, the court focused on the application of antitrust law in general
to NCAA eligibility rules. In rejecting the application of antitrust law to the
no-draft rule, the court stated that
[t]he overriding purpose of the eligibility [r]ules... is not to provide
the NCAA with commercial advantage, but rather.., to prevent
commercializing influences from destroying the unique "product" of
NCAA [athletics] ....[T]his Court believes there is still validity to
the Athenian concept of a complete education derived from fostering
full growth of both mind and body. The overriding purpose behind
the NCAA Rules at issue in this case is to preserve the unique
95
atmosphere of competition between "student-athletes."

Although the court went on to address the implications if the antitrust laws
were applicable, 96 the court's language demonstrates its acceptance of the
NCAA's amateurism objective and its recognition of noncommercial rules (the
eligibility rules "at issue in this case"), while at the same time endorsing the
already-held standard that commercial rules, such as the "NCAA's television
restrictions," 97 are subject to antitrust scrutiny. 98 Although not all courts have
exempted arguably noncommercial rules from antitrust scrutiny, discussed
infra, the Gaines court provided that option while also giving an analysis in
dicta favorable to the NCAA's amateurism objectives. 99 In cases such as
Jones, Gaines and Justice, preserving amateurism is judicially viewed as an
exempt noncommercial regulation of student-athlete eligibility that removes
NCAA rules from the ambit of antitrust scrutiny altogether.
Finally, Jones, Gaines, and Justice lend support to Smith v. NCAA, 100
which involved an allegation that the NCAA's Postbaccalaureate Bylaw
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by restraining trade and having an
anticompetitive effect. 1 1 This bylaw allows post-graduate students to

93. Id.at 741.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2003).
95. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 744.
96. Even if the antitrust laws were applicable, "Gaines cannot succeed on the merits of his § 2

claim because the NCAA has shown legitimate business justifications for the Rules at issue." Id.at
746.
97. Id. at 743.
98. Id.at 744; see also Bd of Regents, 468 U.S. at 85.
99. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 746-47.
100. 139 F.3d 180.
101. Id. at 184.
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participate in intercollegiate athletics only at the school from which the student
earned his or her undergraduate degree. 10 2 In this case, the court focused on
whether "antitrust laws apply only to the alleged infringer's commercial
activities." 10 3 Like the courts in Jones, Gaines, and Justice, the Smith court
found that the Sherman Act does not apply to the NCAA's eligibility rules
because these rules do not give the NCAA a commercial advantage, but
instead "primarily seek to ensure fair competition in intercollegiate
athletics."' 1 4 Also like previous courts, Smith posed a hypothetical application
of the antitrust laws to the Postbaccalaureate bylaw and found that the bylaw
was a "reasonable restraint which furthers the NCAA's goal of fair
competition and the survival of intercollegiate athletics."' 105 The Smith court
continued the acceptance of amateurism 10 6 as a possible bar to antitrust
scrutiny where noncommercial restraints are at issue.
ii. Noncommercial and Commercial Restraints: Antitrust Analysis Applied
The next part of this section examines whether preservation of amateurism
will justify a commercial restraint that has anticompetitive effects. Jones,
Gaines, and Smith removed NCAA rules-primarily eligibility regulationsfrom the auspices of antitrust law because of their noncommercial nature and
objectives. Other instances, however, have arisen within the antitrust context
where the courts did not excuse NCAA rules from antitrust analysis, but did
accept amateurism as an affirmative defense within a rule of reason analysis.
These instances involve both noncommercial and commercial restraints. 107
While "[c]ourts initially held that NCAA rule-making, regulatory, or
enforcement activities do not sufficiently impact interstate trade or commerce
to establish Sherman Act jurisdiction,"' 1 8 they have also come to accept the
102. NCAA Division I Graduate Student/PostbaccalaureateParticipation, Bylaw 14.1.7., in
2002-03 NCAA DIvIsION I MANUAL (2002).
103. Smith, 139 F.3d at 185.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 187.
106. Id. at 185, 187.
107. In general, aside from this broad categorization, courts can handle antitrust laws and
amateur sports associations in one of three ways:
(1) that noneconomic or 'noncommercial' factors are not relevant at all; (2) that they justify a total
exemption from the antitrust laws [discussed supra]; or (3) that they justify application of the rule of
reason in cases which would otherwise be subject to a per se test of illegality. In addition, if the court
applies the rule of reason, it must determine what, if any, weight to give to noneconomic factors.
Wendy T. Kirby & T. Clark Weymouth, Antitrust and Amateur Sports: The Role of Noneconomic
Values, 61 IND. L.J. 31, 32 (1985-1986).
108. Matthew J. Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulation of "Big Time" College
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notion that the running of "big time" college sports is a business that should be
subjected to the Sherman Act, 10 9 even if under a relaxed standard. Because
examination of antitrust allegations within intercollegiate athletics is done
through the rule of reason,1 10 the NCAA has the opportunity to raise the need
to preserve amateurism when defending itself against an antitrust allegation.
The purpose of examining antitrust analysis in regard to noncommercial and
commercial NCAA restraints is to discuss courts' views of the amateurism
defense in relation to the type of restraint involved.
The discussion of noncommercial restraints in antitrust analysis stems
from the second part of the analyses in Jones, Justice, Gaines, and Smith,
where the courts discussed the possible results had the antitrust laws, in fact,
been applicable to those noncommercial restraints. 111 Unlike the Jones,
Justice, Gaines, and Smith courts, however, other courts have not immediately
removed noncommercial restraints, such as coaching staff limits, 1' 2 the no115
draft rule, 113 the no-agent rule, 114 and recruiting rules and punishments,
from the antitrust arena. Following a rule of reason analysis in each instance,
however, these restraints were held reasonable. 116 On the other hand, applying
antitrust analysis to commercial restraints is obvious in nature. Antitrust
regulation was designed to police the effect of restraints on free competition
and commercial enterprise. 117 It is only natural that antitrust laws be applied
to commercial restraints such as television contracts 118 and limits on coaching
120
salaries,11 9 albeit with a rule of reason analysis.
Athletics: The Need to Shift from Nostalgic 1 9 'h and 2 eI Century Ideals of Amateurism to the
Economic Realities of the 21st Century, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 1, 3 (2000).
109. Id.
110. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100-01; accordLaw, 134 F.3d at 1018; Hairston, 101 F.3d at
1319; Banks, 977 F.2d at 1088.
111. Smith, 139 F.3d at 186; Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 746; Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 303-04.
112. Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1136.
113. Banks, 977 F.2d 1081; McCormack, 845 F.2d 1338. The court in McCormack analyzed a
noncommercial restraint by first "[a]ssuming, without deciding, that the antitrust laws apply to the
eligibility rules...." Id. at 1343.
114. McCormack, 845 F.2d 1338.
115. Hairston, 101 F.3d 1315.
116. Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1020; Banks, 977 F.2d at 1090 (where the court found that the
plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and upheld the district court's
finding that the NCAA eligibility rule in question was reasonable); McCormack, 845 F. Supp. at
1343; Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1154.
117. Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1148 (quoting Apex, 310 U.S. at 493; Klor's, 359 U.S. at 213 n.7).
118. Bd of Regents, 468 U.S. 85.
119. Law, 134 F.3d 1010.
120. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103; accordLaw, 134 F.3d at 1018; Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319;
Banks, 977 F.2d at 1088.
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Cases such as Hennessey, Banks, McCormack, and Board of Regents
provide an understanding of the judiciary's antitrust analysis 12 1 and its view of
the NCAA's self-proclaimed need to preserve amateurism with regard to
noncommercial and commercial restraints. First, as noted, courts that do
employ an antitrust analysis with either type of restraint do so under the rule of
reason. 122 For noncommercial restraints, this appears as a compromise
between a complete exemption from antitrust scrutiny and a per se analysis
because, "[w]hile the participating [athletes] may be amateurs, intercollegiate
athletics in its management is clearly business, and big business at that.' ' 123
Using a rule of reason approach allows the NCAA to present justifications for
the restraints and acknowledges that "the NCAA has played an important
role.., in collegiate sports .... [by] adopt[ing] and promulgat[ing] playing
rules, standards of amateurism, standards for academic eligibility, regulations
concerning recruitment of athletes, and rules governing the size of athletic
squads and coach[es].' ' 124 In.essence, while some courts have not given an
antitrust exemption to noncommercial restraints 125 (and have not even
considered it for commercial restraints), they have, at minimum, recognized
the necessity of certain restraints within intercollegiate athletics, and the
importance of the NCAA itself, by utilizing a rule of reason analysis.
Second, proceeding to a rule of reason analysis allows insight into the
courts' attitude towards the NCAA, its purpose and regulations, and the idea
of amateurism in regard to any restraints. Courts have consistently approved
of the NCAA's mission and preservation of amateurism in intercollegiate
athletics' 26 because of the uniqueness of college sports, as compared to
professional sports. 127 For example, the Court in Board of Regents
acknowledged the role of the NCAA in preserving amateurism and the
character of intercollegiate athletics, 12 8 even though these objectives did not

121. This is in comparison with the discussed decisions that exempted noncommercial
intercollegiate athletics restraints from anything but a cursory antitrust analysis.
122. Bd. ofRegents, 468 U.S. at 100-01.
123. Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1150.
124. Bd. ofRegents, 468 U.S. at 88.
125. The question of exempting commercial restraints is moot, since the commercial aspect is the
heart of the antitrust laws.
126. Bd. of Regents, 486 U.S. at 120; Banks, 977 F.2d at 1090 (citing Justice, 577 F. Supp. at

382).
127. According to the Bd. of Regents Court, "the NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of
[college sports]. The identification of this 'product' with an academic tradition differentiates college
[sports] from and makes it more popular than professional sports to which it might otherwise be
comparable." 468 U.S. at 101-02.
128. Id. at 88, 102.
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overcome the anticompetitive nature of the NCAA's television plan. 129 In
dicta, however, the Court lent support to the notion that amateurism is an
acceptable defense for noncommercial restraints because "most of the
regulatory controls of the, NCAA are: justifiable means of fostering
competition among amateur athletic teams- and therefore procompetitive
because they enhance public interest in intercollegiate athletics."' 130 While the
ideal of amateurism finds support in caselaw, 131 it has been more likely to
prevail in cases with noncommercial restraints than in those with commercial
restraints, and in cases where the restraint actually furthers the objective of
amateurism and is the least restrictive means available.
Overall, courts have not been antagonistic to the amateurism objective in
intercollegiate athletics. In fact, they have been understanding. This is
illustrated by courts upholding NCAA rules aimed at preserving the distinction
between amateurism and professionalism, including the no-draft, 132 no135 rules. 136
agent, 133 coaching staff limits, 134 and recruiting-and punishment
Understanding a proposed motive, however, does not always guarantee that
restraints allegedly fueled by that motive will be deemed reasonable under a
rule of reason standard, especially when the restraint is economic in effect.
The next section discusses the ramifications of the deregulation of amateurism
within the NCAA structure, and whether the NCAA will be able to continue to
rely on amateurism as a defense to challenged eligibility rules.
III. DEREGULATION'S EFFECT ON THE AMATEURISM DEFENSE

The NCAA's definition of amateurism is changing. 137 In January 2001,
129. Id. at 120.
130. Id. at 117. Indeed, the Court's use of the "'rule of reason' both... condemn[ed] the
particular restraint and ... suggest[ed], in dicta, the lawfulness of other restraints imposed by the
same organization." Peter C. Carstensen & Paul Olszowka, Antitrust Law, Student-Athletes, and the
NCAA: Limiting the Scope and Conduct of Private Economic Regulation, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 545,
573.
131. Bd of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120; accordSmith, 139 F.3d at 185-86; Banks, 977 F.2d at 1089;
Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 744; Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 304.
132. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1091; McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343.
133. McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343.
134. Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1154.
135. Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1320.
136. As discussed in the next section, the purpose of these rules-maintaining a distinction
between amateurism and professionalism-appears to be challenged by the passed and proposed

deregulation of amateurism, including the aspect of the deregulation that allows former professionals
to retain some collegiate eligibility.
137. It should be noted that there are three deregulation packages discussed (one for each
Division) due to the NCAA's federated membership structure. While governed by an Association-
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Division II membership passed Proposal No. 12, which "deregulates" the
restrictions on the pre-enrollment activities of student-athletes 138 by allowing
139
"athletes who have tried but failed to achieve professional athletics careers"
to retain some form of collegiate eligibility. At the NCAA Convention in
January 2002, Division III membership passed its own form of deregulation by
approving Proposal Nos. 40-44, which allow pre-enrolled student athletes to
accept prize money based on finish, enter a draft, enter a professional contract,
and compete with professionals on a professional team. 140 As discussed
below, the Division I membership approved more conservative changes to its
amateurism rules. 14 1 One obvious issue that comes from these deregulations
is what effect the changes will have on the NCAA's amateurism defense to
antitrust claims, and whether such a defense loses its vitality when NCAA
members themselves are lessening the restrictions 142 aimed at preserving
amateurism. This section gives an overview of the deregulation actions and
proposals of each Division, 143 and discusses the actual use of the defense in
future disputes.
A. Deregulation
The discussion on amateurism includes a spectrum of ideas and plans. On
one hand, "pay for play" proponents argue that student-athletes should be paid
for competing. 144 On the other hand, critics argue that a "pay for play" system
would drastically change the face of collegiate athletics. 145 Amateurism
wide Constitution, "[elach [D]ivision [also] has had the autonomy to craft legislation to best fit its
needs and interests." Gary T. Brown, 2001 Year in Review. The Amateurism Rollercoaster:Bylaw
12 ExaminationsHave Taken Association on a Thrill-a-Month Ride, NCAA NEWS, Dec. 17, 2001,

http://www.ncaa.org/news/2001/20011217/active/3826n32.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2003). While it
is debatable as to whether this autonomy is good in the area of amateurism-with each Division
having the ability to create different standards than the others-the current federated system allows
this to occur.
138. Id.
139. David Pickle, Division II Finds Comfort Zone with Amateurism Legislation, NCAA NEWS,
Sept. 10, 2001, http://www.ncaa.org/news/2001/20010910/active/3819nO2.html (last visited Feb. 26,

2003).
140. Kay Hawes, Division III to Examine its Future, Amateurism ProposalsApproved, NCAA
NEWS, Jan. 21, 2002, at 1.
141. Gary T. Brown, Management Councils Take Mountain-Sized Steps at Denver Session,
NCAA NEWS, Apr. 15, 2002, at 1.
142. By, for example, allowing former professionals to have college eligibility.
143. Although the issues discussed in this paper relate primarily to Division I, the deregulation
plans of all three Divisions are presented here for comparative value.
144. Jeff K. Brown, Comment, Compensation for the Student-Athlete: Preservation of
Amateurism, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 147, 148 (1996).
145. Id.at 149-50.
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deregulation falls within this spectrum and acknowledges the opportunities
and needs of pre-enrolled student-athletes. In general, deregulation attempts
to consider competitive equity and loosens the NCAA's control over
prospective student-athletes with the idea that "rather than linking amateurism
to issues of money and whether someone is labeled as professional,
amateurism should reflect the link between education and sport.'

14 6

This view

allows prospective student-athletes to pursue opportunities prior to
participation in college athletics without losing all eligibility and helps keep
educational opportunities available for prospective student-athletes by not
turning them away from college through ineligibility. 147 While Division I,
primarily because of its "big time" sports of football and men's basketball, is
often the first consideration when the effects of deregulation are discussed,
Divisions II and III were the divisions that actually adopted plans to deregulate
amateurism. The plans of each Division are discussed in the order of their
passage.
i. Division II
At the January 2001 NCAA Convention, Division II became the first
Division to adopt an amateurism deregulation package, known as Proposal
12.148 The package, effective in August 2001, allows pre-enrolled Division II
student-athletes to "accept prize money, sign contracts, enter a professional
draft and/or be drafted, accept compensation for athletics participation and
compete with professionals."' 14 9 In something of a tradeoff, however, the
"seasons-of-competition rule" takes one year of collegiate eligibility from
prospective student-athletes "for every year that an athlete participates in
150
organized competition after the next opportunity to enroll in college."'
Student-athletes choosing to enroll in a Division II school after participating in
organized competition must also fulfill one year in academic residence before
participating. 151
For this deregulation plan, the NCAA Division II Amateurism Project

146. Grant, supra note 12.
147. Division I Subcommittee on Amateurism and Agents, Why Deregulation,
http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/amateurism-deregulation/why_dereg.pdf (last visited Feb.
26, 2003).
148. Brown, supra note 137.

149. Id.
150. NCAA
Division
H
Amateurism
http://www.ncaa.org/agentsamateurism/amateurism/2/overview.html
[hereinafter Overview].
151. Brown, supra note 137.

Deregulation,
Overview,
(last visited Apr. 3, 2003)
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Team shifted the idea of amateurism from the traditional emphasis on money
to two "core values: Welfare of the Prospective Student-Athlete (PSA) and
Competitive Equity.' 152 The Project Team reasoned that, in consideration of a
PSA's welfare, "rules that involve acts that do not give a PSA a competitive
advantage should be liberalized." 53 This was the motivation behind the
allowance of prize money, contracts, entering professional drafts and being
drafted, and accepting compensation for athletics participation. 154 The value
of competitive equity also leads to the "seasons-of-competition" rule. 155 By
switching the focus of amateurism from money to the core values enunciated
by the Project Team, a balance was struck in the evolving world of collegiate
athletics. Current student-athletes remain governed by the same rules, without
a "pay for play" system, while pre-enrolled student-athletes have greater
leeway, although with some ramifications, to pursue professional careers
without immediately losing their entire collegiate eligibility. The question
becomes one of competitive advantage gained in pre-enrollment activity.
Although there are some critics who are concerned with the ramifications of
Division II's decision, 156 proponents point to the educational value-a notion
tied to the amateurism objective of the NCAA in antitrust cases-of the
57
proposals. 1
While Division II's deregulation reduces some collegiate eligibility, it also
allows those who attempt professional and organized competition to maintain
a form of collegiate eligibility. Prior to deregulation a student-athlete would
be permanently ineligible 158 for collegiate competition after professional or
organized competition; now, a student-athlete may retain a form of collegiate
eligibility and take advantage of educational opportunities still available.
Nevertheless, this change in amateurism policy goes against the amateur

152.

Overview, supra note 150.

153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Critics argue that Division II deregulation makes college athletics a place for "failed

professionals," which will upset competitive balance within collegiate sports, and that Division II will
place dominant, successful professional athletes on teams. These situations are unlikely to occur,

however, because of the safeguards in place (the "year for a year" of the "organized competition
rule") and because, in reality, successful professionals are not likely to return to the collegiate level.
Pickle, supra note 139.
157. According to Wingate University President Jerry E. McGee, "There's a price to be paid for

giving your pro career a shot ....
But the price to be paid shouldn't be so severe that you can never
participate in intercollegiate athletics or perhaps go to college." Id.
158. Id.Prior to the adoption of Proposal No. 12, "pre-enrolled student athletes in all divisions
have been ruled permanently ineligible if they have professionalized themselves or shown an intent to
professionalize." Id.
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ideal1 59 because student-athletes who have accepted compensation and
competed with professionals, even though they were pre-enrolled at the time,
are now allowed. to partake in intercollegiate athletic competition as
"amateurs." This may adhere to the NCAA's idea of amateurism, but in
actuality it blurs the line between collegiate student-athletes and professional
athletes.
ii. Division III
Division III is unique among the three Divisions because it alone does not
give student-athletes skill-based financial aid (scholarships). It remains the
purest form of amateurism in this respect; while scholarships may or may not
be considered "pay," the argument remains that there is some form of
compensation in Divisions I and II, not received by others, because of athletic
skill. In January 2002, the Division III membership passed its own
deregulation package at the NCAA Convention. 160 This adoption allows preenrolled student athletes to "accept prize money based on... place finish...
in an open athletics event," 161 "sign a contract with a professional team for
athletics participation,"' 162 "enter a professional draft and be drafted,"' 163 and
"compete with professionals on a professional team." 1 64 Like Division II,
Division III's deregulation includes a "seasons-of-competition" rule that
establishes the years of eligibility a student-athlete has when he enrolls 65 and
which charges a student-athlete one season of competition for "every calendar
year the prospect engages in organized competition after his or her first
opportunity to enroll in college."' 16 6 " Further, after the "seasons-ofcompetition" rule is triggered, the student-athlete must serve one academic
167
year in residence before participating in the sport in question.
One distinct difference between this plan and the one adopted by Division
II is the lack of a "pay for play" proposal for pre-enrolled student-athletes.
While pre-enrolled Division III student-athletes are allowed to accept prize

159. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, supra note 13 and text.
160. Hawes, supra note 140.
161. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N, 2002-03 DivisIoN III AMATEURISM DEREGULATION
http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/divisionGUIDE
FOR
COACHES
7
(2002),
iii amateurismguide/2002-03/amateurismguide.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
162. Id. at 8.
163. Id. at 9.
164. Id. at 10.

165. Id at6.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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money for place finish and sign contracts to compete in professional athletics,
they are not allowed to accept compensation for their athletic participation.
Prospective student-athletes who compete on professional teams or enter a
professional draft may do so as long as they do not accept compensation or
retain the services of an agent. 168 This prohibition of accepting pay for
athletic services is more in-line with notions of pure amateurism and helps
keep Division III athletics as "pure amateur sport" while at the same time
allows the "'failed professional' whose only crime might have been unwisely
signing a contract or entering a draft"'169 to participate in collegiate athletics.
The Division III Task Force on Amateurism posited core values similar to
those of its Division II Project Team counterpart. Competitive fairness and
prospective student-athlete welfare, along with "[c]larity, common sense, and
consistency of amateurism rules ....[and] [c]onsistency with Division III
philosophy" 170 motivated the proposals. In addition, similar to Division II,
the subjective element of "intent" when determining the eligibility of a
student-athlete is removed. Under the old standards, a student who "intended"
to professionalize was penalized with a loss of eligibility; under the new
standards, however, the evaluation of a student-athlete's thought process gives
way to an objective assessment of the student-athlete's experience and
competitive advantage, if any, gained through his activities prior to enrolling
collegiately. 17 1 These changes to the Division III landscape apply "only to
student-athletes before their initial collegiate enrollment and do[] not modify
amateurism rules as they apply to enrolled student-athletes ....[P]rospects
who clearly 'professionalize' themselves by accepting a salary or agreeing to
be represented by an agent still will be ineligible to compete at Division III
institutions." 172 Again, however, like Division II, these deregulation standards
lessen the true meaning of "amateur" by allowing student-athletes to compete
in the collegiate ranks after testing the professional waters.
iii. Division I
Division I, the Division most susceptible to blurring the lines between
amateurs and professionals, chose a form of deregulation that, while not as

168. Kay Hawes, Amateurism Takes Center Stage in Division III, NCAA NEWS, Jan. 7, 2002, at
Al.
169. Hawes, supra note 140.
170. NCAA

Division

III

Amateurism

Deregulation,

Task

Force,

http://www//ncaa.org/agentsamateurism/amateurism/3/taskforce 1.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
171. Id.
172. Gary Kamer, Editorial, ProposalsDon't Betray Division III Principles, NCAA NEWS, Jan.
7, 2002, at 4.

2003]

WEAKENING IT'S OWN DEFENSE?

liberal as Divisions II and III, still alters the meaning of amateurism.' 7 3 The
following pre-enrollment proposals were the primary components included in
the discussion for Division I amateurism deregulation:
Proposal 99-106--Organized Competition: "[P]rospects who do not
enroll full-time in college at their first opportunity after high-school
graduation... will lose a season of eligibility for each year they
participate in organized competition. Those individuals must also
174
fulfill a year in residence."
Proposal 99-107-Professional Draft: Prospects may enter a
75
professional draft, and be drafted, without losing eligibility.'
Proposal 99-108-Signing a Professional Contract: Prospects may
sign a professional
contract without affecting intercollegiate
176
eligibility.
Proposal 99-109--Competition with Professionals: Prospects may
177
play on a professional team without losing eligibility.
Proposal 99-1 10-Prize Money Based on Finish: Prospects may
accept prize money without losing eligibility.
Proposal 99-110-2-Prize Money Based on Finish: Prospects may
"accept prize money for place finish up to actual and necessary
expenses." 78
Proposal 99-11 1-Compensation for Athletics Competition:
Prospects may accept compensation for participation in athletic
competition without losing eligibility. This does not allow prospects
to receive payment for promotional or commercial activities. 179
Proposal 2000-47-Prospects can take educational expenses for high
school or preparatory school, as long as the funds are "disbursed by
the school and not provided by an agent, athletics representative or
80
professional sports team."'
173. See Brown, supranote 141.
174. NCAA Division I Amateurism Deregulation Proposals, Preenrollment Proposals,
http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/amateurism-deregulation/preenrollment_proposals.pdf (last
visited Feb. 26, 2003).

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id
178. Brown, supranote 141.
179. NCAA Division I Amateurism Deregulation Proposals, supra note 175.
180. Brown, supra note 141.
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In April 2002, the Division I Management Council approved a package
that "permits prospects to enter a draft and be drafted ... receive prize money
(not to exceed expenses) .... [and] receive educational expenses to attend a
high school or preparatory school" as long as the funds do not come from "an
agent, athletics representative or professional sports team" and are given out
by the school. 18' Further, the Management Council approved an organizedcompetition rule under which "individuals who participate in organized
competition for no more than one year after high school and who receive no
more than actual and necessary expenses lose one year of eligibility and are
required to spend an academic year in residence after they enroll at a collegiate
institution." 182 At the same time, the accepted package "does not allow
professional contracts, receive a salary or compete with
prospects to sign
' 83
professionals."'
Although Division I limited its deregulation from the options presented,
this deregulation still allows pre-enrolled student-athletes to accept
compensation (up to actual and necessary expenses determined on an eventWhile competition with
by-event basis) for athletic participation.
professionals is still not permitted, the fact that pre-enrolled student-athletes
can receive money for their athletic skill goes against amateur notions.
Nevertheless, although amateurism was deregulated, it was done so in a
relatively conservative manner at the Division I level, helping save the
amateurism defense in antitrust cases. The next part of this section discusses
the continued validity of amateurism as a defense in antitrust cases in light of
the changes in all Divisions.
B. Why Amateurism Can Still be a Valid Defense to ChallengedNCAA
EligibilityRules
The adoption by all Divisions of some type of deregulation harms the
184
validity of the NCAA's amateurism defense to antitrust allegations.

181. Brown, supra note 141.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 15; see also Telephone Interview with Julie Roe, NCAA (Apr. 14, 2003).
184. An example of this difficulty is shown by looking at the Jones case, where the plaintiff was
declared ineligible from intercollegiate athletic competition because he had competed with
professionals and accepted payment for his participation prior to his collegiate enrollment. 392 F.
Supp. at 296-98. Under Division II's adoption, Jones would have retained his eligibility. Had he not

accepted payment for his playing, he would have been eligible under Division III's new regulations,
as well.

He would not be eligible under Division I's deregulation because he competed with

professionals and was compensated for his athletic services (as opposed to receiving only actual and
necessary expenses as prize money, which is allowed). This is not to say that the deregulation of

amateurism eliminates the amateurism defense within antitrust cases; it merely demonstrates the
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Despite this augmentation of amateurism, however, the defense (which has
only come to light because of cases involving Division I institutions) should
still exist, although in a qualified way, for two primary reasons: (i) the
presence of an educational focus and (ii) the scope of the deregulation
proposals in regard to maintaining the NCAA's mission, and the fact that the
Division I Management Council accepted a narrower version of deregulation.
i. Intercollegiate Athletics Remain Tied to Education
The amateurism deregulations do not remove the amateur from
intercollegiate athletics; instead, they adapt to the change in opportunities
afforded to prospective student-athletes. They place a strong emphasis on
competitive balance and fairness, and they still prohibit an enrolled studentMost
athlete from receiving compensation for athletic participation.
importantly, however, the amateurism proposals keep education at the front of
intercollegiate athletics because they allegedly increase the number of
prospective student-athletes who may attend college. Although it may not be
for the right reason, many student-athletes attend college in order to play their
sport; at the same time, they end up receiving an education. By lessening the
amateurism restrictions on prospective student-athletes, people who may not
have ever entered college because of amateurism "red tape"' 185 will now
consider it an option because they still have athletic eligibility. Education's
relation to amateurism should continue to encourage courts to at least consider
the amateurism defense.
Admittedly, the idea of "amateurism" is tailored to the NCAA's interests
through deregulation. "Amateurism" in the NCAA-sense may or may not be
the exact definition generally associated with the concept; however, the
NCAA's definition of amateurism for enrolled student-athletes, within the
games that it governs in intercollegiate athletics, has remained the same.
Christine Grant, Chairperson of the Division I Subcommittee on Agents and
Amateurism, defended the alleged change in amateurism, which can be held as
a statement across all Divisions:
The subcommittee often is asked why it is changing the NCAA's
philosophy of amateurism. In actuality, nothing in the amateurism
proposals alters this philosophy as reflected in NCAA Principle 2.9The Principle of Amateurism: "Student-Athletes shall be amateurs in
an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated
primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits
difficulty courts may face when dealing with precedent and current issues.
185. See, e.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d 77 (Ky. 2001).
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to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an
avocation and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation
186
by professional and commercial enterprises."'
In essence, the NCAA is following what it has always followed
(questionable as that may be in itself because of economic interests) and what
the courts have accepted: The Principle of Amateurism. This tie to education
emphasizes the avocation aspect of intercollegiate athletics and correlates to
the still-present amateur ideal.
Alternatively, there are enough protections in place in the new rules to
safeguard intercollegiate athletics from "failed professionals" and others not
seeking to also gain an education while competing in intercollegiate athletics.
The seasons-of-competition rule in Divisions II and III takes a year of
eligibility from the prospective student-athlete for each year played in
organized competition between high school and college, and requires an
academic year in residence before beginning collegiate competition once this
rule is triggered. Division I's organized-competition rule imposes similar
guidelines. Hence, student-athletes are faced with committing to educational,
amateur values or forgoing intercollegiate competition. This, too, emphasizes
the NCAA's continuing commitment to amateurism. While there are
economic objectives within the NCAA, "amateurism" (the NCAA's
"amateurism" means that former professionals are still amateurs in
determining intercollegiate athletic eligibility) still remains an essential part of
intercollegiate athletics.
ii. Scope: The Proposals Do Not Regulate Actual Collegiate Athletic
Competition
The second reason that deregulation should not be considered a bar to the
amateurism antitrust defense expands upon the first. Deregulation does not
regulate actual participation in intercollegiate athletics; the NCAA's goal of
amateurism within this competition remains untouched because deregulation
applies only to pre-enrolled student athletes. Although Division I, where the
litigation has taken place, adopted a more conservative approach, Divisions II
and III-also a part of the NCAA-adopted their own deregulation packages.
This overall intention to deregulate should have some impact on the overall
view of the NCAA's amateurism.
These plans limit the NCAA's control of pre-enrolled student-athletes, and
acknowledge that the "principle [of amateurism] was expanded to the
preenrollment period without a clear directive about the intended purpose of
186. Grant, supra note 12.
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such an expansion." 18 7 While it is not a strict version of amateurism because
it allows former professionals to be current "amateurs" in some instances
under deregulation, the NCAA still adheres to its Principle of Amateurism,
which is what it has proffered as a defense in antitrust cases, and which is
what courts have looked upon with favor, even if ultimately determining that
the anticompetitive factors of a restraint in question outweigh the
procompetitive effects motivated by amateurism.
In addition, deregulation does not allow a "pay for play" system in regard
to currently enrolled student-athletes. This lends itself to supporting the
NCAA's objectives of amateurism and education within the scope of the
organization'scontrol. As Grant's comment points out, it is still the same
version of amateurism that has been espoused through the NCAA's Principle
of Amateurism, and that the courts have accepted. The hard part now,
however, will be explaining to courts why some current student-athletes were
allowed to professionalize before college, making them something less than a
true amateur. Although not in college at the time, the fact remains that some
student-athletes will have competed professionally and received money for
their skill. The NCAA must encourage courts to keep the focus on the belief
that the "NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition
of amateurism in college sports."'18 8 Whether or not this belief outweighs the
anticompetitive effects of a given restraint or is the least restrictive means to
accomplishing the objective is left to the courts, but the amateurism defense
still deserves consideration in the balancing.
These two reasons demonstrate that the deregulation of amateurism does
not eliminate the NCAA's amateurism defense in antitrust cases, although it
should cause courts to more closely examine such defenses. The new rules do
not affect actual intercollegiate athletic competition-the "'product' with an
academic tradition"'189 that the NCAA seeks to market-and they noticeably
state the intended focus and connection to educational values. They do,
however, call into question the amateuristic purity of student-athletes who
have had prior professional and/or paid experience, since this does not fully
adhere to amateur values. The issues become the balance between the
activities of pre-enrolled and current student-athletes, and what realm the
NCAA actually deserves control over. While admirably taking the stance that
(at least for some situations) it does not control student-athletes before they
enter college, the NCAA has nevertheless lessened its own "product" by
allowing certain past experiences to not influence student-athlete eligibility,
187. Id.
188. Bd ofRegents, 468 U.S. at 120.
189. Id. at 101.

MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 13:257

even when that allowance may contradict the idea of amateurism. In light of
the fact that Division I cases are the primary issue, however, and that Division
I membership accepted a lesser version of deregulation, under a rule of reason
analysis in certain circumstances the amateurism defense should still be
considered a legitimate, procompetitive justification to an implemented
restraint. Those circumstances are discussed in the next part of Section III.
C. Qualificationsto the Amateurism Defense
There are two parts to understanding the use of the amateurism defense in
future antitrust claims against the NCAA. First, the previous parts of Section
III established that there is still, in some way, a mission of amateurism within
the NCAA, and that it is tied to education and the scope of the NCAA's
control of the actual competition in collegiate athletics. Second, the remaining
issue is what type of deference courts should give to amateurism, in light of
the deregulation actions, and what restraints are justified by the need to
preserve amateurism.
First, noncommercial restraints, such as eligibility rules, can still receive a
measured level of deference from the courts because of amateurism's
continued presence, albeit in an amended version, in the NCAA's mission.
Because of deregulation creating a possibly lesser value of amateurism and
because of the NCAA's economic interests, however, all noncommercial
restraints should be subject to a rule of reason antitrust analysis that accepts
amateurism as a procompetitive justification to the alleged anticompetitive
restraint. This method takes into account the NCAA membership's changed
concept of amateurism, but at the same time allows the mission of amateurism
and education to be proffered as defenses. It also acknowledges that the
restraints in question are noncommercial in nature, and that Division I, as the
main ground for litigation, accepted the least deregulation of amateurism.
Still, the NCAA should be seen as a whole, and the decisions by Divisions II
and III to deregulate amateurism on their levels effects the organization's use
of the defense. Hence, these restraints should be subject to antitrust analysis
because of the NCAA's economic objectives and the changing face of
amateurism, but should be afforded deference because of their noncommercial
traits and because amateurism is still, in some form, a mission of the NCAA.
Second, the NCAA would be wise to limit the amount of economic
restraints it places on its members. The NCAA's economic interests were
shown in Board of Regents and Law, where restraints on television rights and
coaching salaries were declared unreasonable. The combination of an
economic interest and an altered version of amateurism at some levels will
likely have a difficult time overcoming the anticompetitive effects of a given
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commercial restraint. When such economic restraints are necessary, they
should be closely tied with procompetitive noncommercial objectives, 190 such
as education and eligibility, and should be the least restrictive alternative
possible. While an economic restraint might actually be necessary to promote
noncommercial interests, such a restraint will probably be looked at as "an
attempt to further [the NCAA's] economic interests [.by] assert[ing] a
regulatory power appropriate only to further its goals of academic
integrity."' 19 1 Simply because a noncommercial objective is a goal of the
organization will not qualify it as the justification for an economic restraint.
While amateurism still exists as a part of the NCAA, too much has changed in
the collegiate athletics landscape to blindly accept the defense of amateurism
when a commercial, economic restraint is involved. Amateurism may be used
as a defense, but it should face a higher level of scrutiny because of the
underlying commercial objectives.
IV. CONCLUSION

The deregulation of amateurism should change the courts' view of the
NCAA's amateurism defense in antitrust cases, although it will probably not
do so in a drastic manner. It is legitimate to hold true economic restraints to a
Restraints that are
strict antitrust analysis under the rule of reason.
noncommercial in nature, 192 or that are commercial in nature but have valid,
legitimate, related noncommercial justifications, however, should be given
deference by the courts. This means examining the proffered reasons and
justifications for the restraint. Therefore, under a rule of reason analysis,
noncommercial restraints should receive the. deference-although not an
exemption from antitrust law-of the courts because of the established
continuation of the NCAA's form of amateurism, and commercial restraints
should receive a scrutiny that is skeptical of the amateurism defense in light of
the current changes and the economic objectives of the NCAA. In order for
commercial restraints to pass judicial muster, they should be closely tied to
education or amateurism. While "the availability to the NCAA of the
amateurism justification, and the courts' history of complicity in protecting
sports organizations from the full force of antitrust law[] make it unlikely that
the basic structure of college sports will be overturned judicially in the near

190. Kirby & Weymouth, supra note 107, at 51.

191. Christopher L. Chin, Comment, Illegal Procedures: The NCAA's Unlawful Restraint of the
Student-Athlete, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1213, 1218 (1993).

192. Id. at 1217 (commenting that "if a regulation affects the academic integrity of the studentathlete, courts should give a great deal of deference to the NCAA").
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future," 193 it is also unlikely that the courts should be as supportive of the
amateurism defense as they have been in past cases because of the NCAA's
changing self-defined notion of amateurism.
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193. Krakau, supra note 41, at 434-35.
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